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Intellectual property rights (IPRs) affect international trade flows when knowledge-intensive goods
move across national boundaries.  The importance of IPRs for trade has gained more significance as the
share of knowledge-intensive or high technology products in total world trade has doubled between 1980
and 1994 from 12% to 24%.1  At the international level, IPRs have traditionally been governed by several
conventions - most prominently the Paris Convention for patents and trademarks and the Berne
Convention for copyright - which are administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO).  In the 1980s, mounting disputes over IPRs lead to the inclusion of trade-related IPRs on the
agenda of the GATT/WTO Uruguay round and the resulting "Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights
Agreement, including Trade in Counterfeit Goods" (TRIPs) of 1994 represents the most far-reaching
multilateral agreement towards global harmonization of IPRs.2
Several studies have attempted to estimate the extent to which IPRs are trade-related.  Maskus and
Penubarti (1995) use an augmented version of the Helpman-Krugman model of monopolistic competition
to estimate the effects of patent protection on international trade flows.  Their results indicate that higher
levels of protection have a positive impact on bilateral manufacturing imports into both small and large
developing economies.  These results are confirmed by Primo Braga and Fink (1997) where we estimated
a similar model and found the same positive link between patent protection and trade flows.
This study provides new evidence regarding the effects of patent protection on international trade.
It employs a gravity model of bilateral trade flows and estimates the effects of increased protection on a
cross-section of 89x88 countries.  It improves on previous studies in two respects.  First, we estimate the
gravity model for two different kind of aggregates: total non-fuel trade and high technology trade.
Second, it addresses the problem of zero trade flows between countries by adopting a bivariate distributed
probit regression model.  Second, to measure the strength of IPRs regimes, we make use of a fine tuned
index on national IPRs systems developed by Park and Ginarte (1996).  Our results confirm previous
findings suggesting a positive link between IPRs protection and trade flows for the total non-fuel trade
aggregate.  However, IPRs are not found to be significant for high technology trade flows.
' These estimates  are based on trade data from the UN Comtrade  database. For the definition  of high
technology  products,  see Table 1.
2 For a detailed  review  of the TRIPs  Agreement  and its economic  implications,  see Primo  Braga  (1996).
1The next section provides a summary of theoretical considerations involved.  Section III presents
the estimation set-up.  Section IV reports the results obtained.  Section V compares our results to related
studies.  Section VI concludes the paper.
II.  A review of the economics of trade-related intellectual property rights
The conventional economic rationale for the protection of IPRs in closed economies can be found
in Arrow (1962).  Since knowledge is non-rival in nature, it should be freely available (apart froim  the
cost of transmitting knowledge).  If this were the case, however, the market would underinvest in the
production of new knowledge, because innovators would not be able to recover their costs.  By granting
innovators the exclusive rights to commercialize their intellectual assets over a certain period of time,
IPRs offer an incentive for the production of knowledge.  In short, IPRs introduce a static distortion (i.e.,
access to proprietary knowledge is sold above its marginal cost), which is rationalized as an effective way
to foster the dynamic benefits associated with innovative activities.
IPRs are territorial in character, that is, they are created by national laws and differ across
countries.  If intellectual property embedded in goods and services originating in country A crosses the
border to country B, two questions arise.  First, how will IPRs protection in country B affect the
magnitude of the bilateral trade flow from country A to B; and second what are the implications of such
protection on economic welfare of both countries A and B.
Bilateral trade flows and differences in IPRs protection
IPRs affect international trade flows in several ways.  A firm, for example, may be deterred to
export its patented good into a foreign market, if potential "pirates" can diminish the profitability of the
firm's activity in that market because of a weak IPRs regime. Accordingly, a strengthening of a country's
patent regime would tend to increase imports as foreign firms would face increasing net demand.  for their
products reflecting the displacement of pirates. On the other hand, a firm may choose to reduce its sales
in a foreign market as a response to stronger IPRs protection because of its greater market power in an
imitation safe environment.  These opposing market-expansion and market-power effects imply that the
overall effect of IPRs protection on bilateral trade flows is theoretically  ambiguous (Maskus ancl
Penubarti 1995).
2A further source of ambiguity stems from the fact that differing levels of IPRs protection may
affect a firm's decision on its preferred mode of serving a foreign market. A firm may choose to serve a
foreign market by foreign direct investment (FDI) or by licensing its intellectual asset to a foreign firm
instead of exporting the product in an environment characterized by strong IPRs (Ferrantino 1993).3
Thus, strengthened IPRs protection may have a further negative effect on trade flows in this respect.
Welfare implications
The implications of tighter IPRs on economic welfare are highly complex.  The simple fact that
trade flows rise or fall in response to tighter IPRs is not sufficient for drawing conclusions regarding
economic welfare.  Both static and dynamic effects need to be considered.  Moreover, in this paper, we
are primarily concemed with the effects of IPRs on international trade flows.  In a different paper (Primo
Braga and Fink 1997), we discuss how tighter IPRs affect economic welfare through FDI, the transfer of
technology, and domestic R&D.  The following paragraphs give a brief summary of the associated static
and dynamic costs and benefits for two trading economies that may arise only in response to changes in
trade flows fostered by stronger IPRs.
From a static, partial-equilibrium point of view, the source country of the trade flow is likely to
gain from tighter protection, because it can capture increased monopoly profits from the sale of its goods
abroad.  In contrast, the static effects on the welfare of the destination country are likely to be negative:
increased market power by foreign title holders leading to deadweight losses.4 In this view, many small,
innovation-consuming countries fear that increased patent protection will only lead to a rent transfer to
developed, innovation-producing countries.5
From a static, general-equilibrium point of view, tighter IPRs tend to be further detrimental to the
destination country of the trade flow because the reallocation of production, i.e. the shift of product lines
3 FDI as a mode  of serving  a foreign  country  is of special  relevance  because  the existence  of intangible  assets
such as intellectual property is a major rationale for the existence of (horizontally integrated) TNCs (Caves 1996).
The importance of FDI is also highlighted by the fact that in 1992 world wide sales of foreign affiliates (USS 5,325
billion) exceeded global exports of goods and services (US$ 4,570 billion).  See The World Bank (1996) for further
details.
4 See, for example, Deardorff (1992).  Nogues (1993), Maskus and Konan (1994) and Subramanian (1995)
try to estimate these deadweight losses for the pharmaceutical industry in several developing countries.
5 This scenario assumes that the destination country is able to imitate the source countries' products in the
absence of IPRs.  If this is not the case, i.e. if technology is not freely available, the introduction of IPRs creates
consumer surplus in the form of newly available products which may partly offset the deadweight loss.  In this
view, tighter IPRs are beneficial in that they transfer technology.
3from the destination country to the source country, worsens the terms of trade in favor of the source
country.  In addition, the reallocation of production may reduce welfare in both countries as efficiency
considerations call for an allocation of manufacturing to the region with lower costs.6 This effect may be
of particular relevance if one recalls that most countries with weak IPRs are low-wage, developing
countries.7
From a dynamic point of view, the introduction of IPRs stimulates innovation in the source
country and thus increase future trade flows.  This will be beneficial for both trading economies assuming
that social returns on these innovations exceed private returns.8 The international recognition of IPRs
also can be seen as an adjustment mechanism which guarantees the functioning of dynamic competition
between countries.  Through IPRs, innovation producing countries have an incentive to develop new
technologies which in their next generation are manufactured by follower countries.  This mechanism
thus leads to continued technological progress and economic growth and from a dynamic point of view is
beneficial for both leaders and followers (Fisch and Speyer 1995).
To sum up, the overall effect of IPRs protection on levels of bilateral trade flows is ambiguous.
From a static welfare point of view, IPRs can be viewed as a rent transfer mechanism which deteriorates
the international allocation of production.  Most studies conclude that the destination country looses from
tighter protection whereas the source country is usually better off.9 However, benefits of a dynamic
nature can be identified for both trading partners.  On average, it is not clear whether these dynamic
benefits can compensate for the static losses in the countries strengthening their IPRs systems and
whether tighter IPRs improve world economic welfare via their impact on trade flows.  It is worth
pointing out that these theoretical considerations may be moot in a world economy in which political
economy considerations are clearly in favor of higher standards of protection. I0
6 See Helpman  (1993),  who develops  these  conclusions  from a dynamic  general  equilibrium  modeL  with two
regions,  one product,  and one factor.
7 The welfare  implications  resulting  from  the reallocation  of production  may be partly  offset  by increased
production  via foreign subsidiaries  (FDI).
8 Diwan and Rodrik  (1991),  for example,  show  that a Southern,  innovation-consuming  country  may have an
incentive  to protect  patent  rights, if it has a different  distribution  of preferences  over  the range of exploitable
technologies  and R&D  resources  in  Northern,  innovation-producing  countries  are scarce.
9  See, for example,  Chin and Grossman  (1988),  Deardorff  (1991),  and Helpman  (1993).
0 See, for example,  Primo  Braga  (1996)  for a discussion  of the political  economy  in  the context  oif  the
TRIPS  negotiations.
4III.  Empirical analysis: the estimation set-up
To empirically estimate the effects of increased patent protection on bilateral trade flows we use a
conventional gravity model.  Gravity models have been applied successfully to explain different types of
international flows, such as migration, commuting, recreational traffic, and trade.  Typically, they specify
that a flow from country i to countryj  can be explained-by supply conditions in country i, by demand
conditions in countryj,  and by forces.either assisting or resisting the flow's movement. 1l
Our depend variables are bilateral trade flows for 89x88 countries which were extracted from the
United Nations Comtrade database.  The data refer to 1989 total non-fuel and high technology trade.  The
rationale for using high technology trade flows besides total non-fuel trade is based on the a priori
expectation that the effects of IPRs protection are stronger for knowledge-intensive trade.  For a
definition of our high technology aggregate, see Table 1.
Following earlier specifications of gravity models, our explanatory variables are GDP and
population of both countries i andj,  geographical distance between the two countries, a dummy variable
which is one if the two countries share a common border and zero otherwise, and a dummy variable
which is one if the two countries share the same language and zero otherwise.12 The coefficients on
GDP are expected to be positive and around unity (Anderson 1979); the coefficients on population are
expected to be small and negative, representing economies of scales (Linneman  1966). Positive
geographic and cultural distance are expected to have a negative influence on bilateral trade flows; that is
the coefficient on geographical distance is expected to be negative. the coefficients on common border
and language are expected to be positive.  The data appendix gives more information on the countries
included and the sources of all variables.
" Gravity  models  were developed  based  on intuitive  reasoning  rather  than economic  modeling. Due to their
empirical  success,  there  have been  numerous  attempts  to shed  some light on the economic  underpinnings  of the
gravity  equation. Linneman  (1966)  showed  how the standard  gravity equation  can be derived  from a quasi-
Walrasian  general  equilibrium  model  of export  supply  and import  demand. Leamer  and Stem (1970)  showed  how a
gravity  model  can be derived  from a probability  model  of trade  patterns. Anderson  (1979) suggested  a theoretical
foundation  in terms of an expenditure  system  with  goods  differentiated  bv countries  of origin. Bergstrand  (1985
and 1989)  used a general  equilibrium  world  trade  model  assuming  utility- and profit-maximizing  agent  behavior  and
showed  that  the gravity  model "fits  in" with  the Heckscher-Ohlin  model  of inter-industry  trade and the Helpman-
Krugman-Markusen  models  of intra-industry  trade.
12 See,  for example,  Tinbergen  (1962),  Linneman  (1966),  Aitken (1973),  Pelzman  (1977),  and Primo  Braga,
Safadi,  and Yeats  (1994).
5To capture the effects of preferential trading agreements, we also include separate dummy
variables for the European Community (EC), the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA), the Latin
American Integration Association/Latin American Free Trade Association (LAIA/LAFTA), the
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Central American Common Market
(CACM). We expect positive coefficient on these five dummy variables.
Finally, to capture the effect of intellectual property rights on bilateral trade flows we use the IPRs
index developed by Park and Ginarte (1996).13  This index grades national IPRs regimes of 110
countries on a scale from zero to five.  To compute a country's ranking, Park and Ginarte (1996) create
five different categories - extent of coverage, membership in international patent agreements, provisions
for loss of protection, enforcement mechanisms, and duration of protection.  For each category, they use
several benchmark criteria (e.g. patentability of pharmaceuticals for extent of coverage) and comipute  the
share of "fulfilled" criteria.  A country's score is the unweigthed sum of these shares over all
categories.14 The United States receives the highest score with 4.52; several countries without patent
laws (e.g., Angola, Burma, Ethiopia, Papua New Guinea) receive a score of 0.
A common problem regarding the estimation of bilateral trade flows is that some flows are
reported as zero because countries do not trade with each other.  For example, in our data set on average
about 26% of the total non fuel trade flows and 53% of high technology trade flows are zero.  A standard
log-linear model with a log-normally distributed error term cannot, by definition, explain these zero trade
flows.  Simple exclusion of zero trade flows would lead to a potential sample selection bias.  There are
several ways how to address this problem.  We follow Bikker and de Vos (1992), who propose a bivariate
normally distributed probit regression. 15 The model consists of an equation for the probability of zero
observations and an equation for the magnitude of a positive action:
13 For a short  review  of alternative  indices  see Primo  Braga  and Fink (1997). The Park and  Ginarte  index  is
most attractive  in the present  context  because  it has the broadest  country  coverage  and refers  to the state  of
protection  as of 1990  which is consistent  with  our trade data. Moreover,  compared  to the index developecL  by Rapp
and  Rozek  (1990), it allows  for a much more fine tuned ranking  of national  IPRs regimes.
'4 Park and Ginarte  (1996) recognize  the possibility  that different  weights for each category  may significantly
alter  a country's  ranking. They  examine  how sensitive  their index is to changes  in the weights  of the categories  and
conclude  that "...the  ordering  of IPR values by country  is not sensitive  to the application  of equal  weighting  (or
unweighting)  of categories".
'5 An alternative  approach  to deal with  the problem  of zero trade  flows is to use a log-linear  specification
with  an additive  normally  distributed  error term,  which  can explain  non-positive  flows,  and a Tobit  limited
dependent  variable  model  (see Rohweder,  1988). We obtained  reasonable  estimates  with  this approach  for the total
non-fuel  aggregate,  but could not obtain  a maximum  likelihood  for the high technology  aggregate. We attributed
this  to the non-linear  nature  of the model and the corresponding  undesirable  features  of the likelihood  function.
6(1)  I,0t  if  zYy+v..  <0
lY  if  z y + v>  O
(2)  yij  x,)B + uj,.
I.  is the observed phenomenon which is 0 if the bilateral trade flow between country i andj  is zero and
y# - the log of bilateral trade - if the trade flow is positive; z.  is the log of the variables explaining the
probability of a positive observation (the gravity variables without the preferential trading dummies and
the Park and Ginarte index), and r the corresponding vector of coefficients for these variables. 16  vu is
a normally distributed error term with mean zero; the variance of vq is normalized to one as all
parameters y  are determined apart from a constant.  x,  is the logarithm of the explanatory variables for
positive trade flows (the gravity variables and the Park and Ginarte index), ,B the corresponding vector of
coefficients to be estimated, and uu a normally distributed error term with mean zero and variance a0
The error terms v,  and  u.  are correlated with each other and drawn from a bivariate normal distribution
with a correlation coefficient equal to p.  Equations (1) and (2) can be estimated by maximum likelihood
technique.  Appendix A derives the likelihood function.
Besides addressing the problem of sample selectivity, the bivariate probit regression model is
attractive because it also estimates the effects of explanatory variables (such as IPRs) on the probability
that two countries trade with each other.
Two alternative specifications are estimated:  Model (I) estimates the probit and gravity equations
without the Park and Ginarte index whereas Model (II) includes the Park and Ginarte index.  The
rationale for this exercise is to evaluate what impact inclusion of IPRs have on the other explanatory
variables.  Moreover, to evaluate the robustness of the results, we estimate these two model specifications
for both exports - bilateral trade flows from country i to countryj  as reported by country i - and imports
- bilateral trade flows from countryj  to country i as reported by country i.  Since we are primarily
16 The reason for excluding  the preferential  trading  dummies  is that  zero trade flows do not occur in (most)
preferential  trading agreements.  Inclusion  of these  variables  in the probit regression  would  then lead to perfect
colinearity.
7interested in the role of IPRs in attracting trade flows and not in creating trade flows, we only use the
Park and Ginarte index of the destination country of the trade flow as explanatory variable (that is
countryj  in the case of exports and country i in the case of imports).
IV.  Empirical Estimates
Our estimation results are presented in Tables 2 through 5.  The overall performance of the rnodels
is quite good.  Most gravity variables have the expected signs and are statistically significant.  Exceptions
are for total non-fuel trade (Tables 2 and 3) the coefficient on the border dummy which has the wrong
sign in the probit equation and is not statistically significant in the gravity equation; and the wrong signs
of the coefficients on the dummies indicating EC and EFTA membership in the gravity equation, which
are, however, never significant.  For the high technology aggregate (Table 4 and 5), the exceptions are
similar: the coefficients on the border dummy in the probit equation and on EC and EFTA membership in
the gravity equation are never statistically significant and sometimes have the wrong sign. Likelihood
ratio tests indicate that for all alternative specifications estimated the explanatory variables are join,tly
significantly different from zero.
The estimated correlation coefficients between the probit and gravity equations p  are always close
to zero and not statistically significant based on a likelihood ratio test for both total non-fuel and high
technology trade.  This suggests that for our data it would have been possible to estimate the equations
independently and that the exclusion of zero observations in the gravity equation does not lead to a bias
stemming from a non-random sample selection.
Recalling the theoretical ambiguity of the effect of IPRs on bilateral trade described in Section II,
we had no prior expectations regarding the sign of the coefficient on the Park and Ginarte index.  F'or
both total non-fuel imports and exports, the Park and Ginarte index has only a small effect on the
probability of positive trade flows between countries, although the effect is positive and statistically
significant at the 5% level for total non-fuel exports.  Turning to the gravity equation, IPRs have a
significantly positive impact on bilateral trade flows for both total non-fuel imports and exports.
Comparisons of models (I) and (II) in Tables 2 and 3 suggests that inclusion of IPRs leads to relatively
small changes in the coefficients of most gravity variables.  The biggest changes occur in the coefficients
on GDP and population of the destination country of the trade flow.  These changes can be explained by
the strong correlation between the strength of IPRs protection and the level of economic development as
8measured by per capita GDP.17 To what extent we pick up development related effects related to
bilateral trade with the Park and Ginarte index remains open to discussion.
For high technology trade in Tables 4 and 5 the evolving pattern is different.  For both exports and
imports, the Park and Ginarte index has a significantly negative impact on the probability that countries
trade with each other.  The impact of IPRs on positive trade flows, in turn, is slightly negative but not
statistically significant.  This result is somewhat surprising.  If IPRs influence trade flows, we would
expect this influence to be most visible for trade in knowledge-intensive goods.  Several explanations can
be brought forward.  First, strong market power effects in the case of high technology goods may offset
positive market expansion effects caused by stronger IPRs regimes.  Second, stronger IPRs regimes may
cause high technology firms to serve foreign markets by FDI, in-part substituting for trade flows.  Third,
it may be that the Park and Ginarte index does not correctly capture the IPRs effect (see below for a
discussion) or that development related effects interplay with stronger IPRs protection.  Fourth, our high
technology aggregate may include many knowledge-intensive goods which are insensitive to the
destination country's IPRs regime; for these goods other than legal means may be more important in
appropriating investment in R&D (e.g., first mover advantage or rapid movement down the learning
curve).  Finally, we omitted important explanatory variables in our gravity equation such as tariff and
non-tariff trade barriers; this type of specification error may bias our estimated results.
V.  Comparisons to related studies
There are several related studies which also try to estimate the effects of intellectual property rights
on bilateral trade flows. 18 Maskus and Konan (1994) also use a gravity model to estimate the effect of
IPRs protection on bilateral trade.  They regress the index developed by Rapp and Rozek (1990) along
with several other development-related variables on the residual of the gravity flow estimation.  This
approach, however, produces only valid estimates if these variables were uncorrelated with the
independent variables of the gravity estimation.  This is clearly not the case as both GDP and population
'7 In our data, the Personian  correlation  coefficient  between  GNP per capita  and the Park and Ginarte  index
lies around  65%.
" In addition  to the studies  survey in this  section,  Primo  Braga  and Fink (1997)  and Ferrantino  (1993) also
provide  econometric  evidence  regarding  the IPRs-trade  link.
9are included in the gravity model. 19 Hence, it is not clear to what extent Makus and Konan's fincling of a
positive IPRs trade link is reliable.
Maskus and Penubarti (1995) estimate the effect of IPRs on bilateral trade flows in an augrnented
version of the Helpman-Krugman model of monopolistic competition.  Imports of good i by countryj
from exporter k as a share of aggregate expenditure in countryj  are explained by the sectoral exporter
output, the importer GNP per capita, trade-resistance measures for the importing country (tariff revenue
as a percentage of dutiable imports, black-market exchange rate premia), and the Rapp and Rozelc  index
of patent strength for countryj.2 0 Dummy variables indicating whether the importing developing
country has a small or large market are interacted with the Rapp and Rozek index.
To address the problem of endogeneity and also potential errors of measurement in the Rapp and
Rozek index, Maskus and Penubarti adopt an instrumental variable approach.  Their instruments are prior
indicators of the level of economic development (GDP per capita, primary exports as a share of total
exports, infant mortality rate, and secondary enrollment ratios), and dummy variables for former British
and French colonies, for membership in Paris and Beme Conventions, and for the existence of legislative
provision for pharmaceutical and chemical product patents. Maskus and Penubarti find a positive IPRs-
trade link: countries with stronger patent regimes import more than what is predicted by the Helpman-
Krugman model.  Moreover, the impact of patent protection on trade flows is found to be bigger in the
larger developing countries.
In comparing Maskus and Penubarti's results to our findings, two things need to be pointed out.  As
Maskus and Penubarti, we, too, face the problem of endogeneity and measurement error.  It can be
argued, however, that the degree of endogeneity may not be too severe if one takes into account that most
countries' IPRs regimes were established during or before the 1960s and the level of protection remained
fairly constant until 1989/90 (the years of our estimation).2 1 Still issues of measurement error can be
quite severe.  Although the Park and Ginarte index considers more aspects of an IPRs system than the
'9  Moreover,  it is not clear  what lower  Maskus  and Konan (1994)  use with  regard to their Tobit  estimation;
since  the model  specification  is standard  log-linear,  it cannot,  by definition,  be zero. Finally,  they do not diescribe
how they compute  the predicted  values  for the residuals  of the Tobit estirnation;  this requires non-standard
procedures  (McDonald  and Moffit 1980).
20 Sectoral  exporter  output  is used as predicted  by a first-stage  regression  designed  to address  endogeneity
problems.
2] Park and Ginarte  (1996)  compute  their IPRs  ranking  quinquennially  from 1960  to 1990. The average  level
of patent  protection  increased  from 2.13 in 1960  to 2.46.
10Rapp and Rozek index (e.g. the availability of enforcement mechanisms), it only measures the level of
protection as written "on the books".  It is well-known, however, that dejure protection may be quite
different from defacto protection.  With respect to Maskus and Penubarti's instrument variable approach,
it needs to be pointed out that most of their instruments tend to be strongly correlated with bilateral trade
flows.  Hence, it is not clear to what degree Maskus and Penubarti really reduce problems related to
endogeneity and measurement error.
A potential problem in Maskus and Penubarti's estimation lies in the way they interact the Rapp
and Rozek index with dummy variables for small and large developing countries.  As mentioned
previously, the strength of patent protection tends to be strongly correlated with the level of economic
development.2 2 Through interaction with the two dummies, the Rapp and Rozek index is allowed a
much more flexible impact than GNP per capita.  Hence, it may be that the three coefficients estimated
for the Rapp and Rozek index pick up a misspecification in the functional form of GNP per capita.  Their
estimated coefficient on GNP per capita is not significantly different from zero for most cases, which
they attribute to the notion of homothetic preferences.  Unfortunately, they do not report estimation
results without interacting the Rapp and Rozek index with dummies; it is thus difficult to evaluate the
seriousness of this potential problem in Maskus and Penubarti's study.2 3
VI.  Summary and Conclusion
With an increasing share of knowledge-intensive products in international trade and the inclusion
of trade-related IPRs on the agenda of the GATT/WTO, IPRs have become an important trade issue.
Political economy considerations -- as reflected in the TRIPS Agreement -- favor higher standards of
IPRs protection.
22 Maskus  and Penubarti  (1995)  report a correlation  coefficient  of 0.712  between  the Rapp and Rozek index
and GNP  per capita.
23 We also estimated  our gravity  model  in a similar  way as Maskus  and Penubarti  (1995). Instead  of the Park
and Ginarte  index,  we used the Rapp  and Rozek index interacted  with  three dummies  for high income  countries,
large developing  countries,  and small  developing  countries. Our estimated  coefficients  were similar:  we find a
significantly  positive  IPRs-trade  link for large  developing  countries. However,  inclusion  of the Rapp and Rozek
index interacted  with  the three dummies  lead to large  changes in the coefficients  on GDP and population. We
concluded  that the relatively  more  flexible  impact  of IPRs in our model  indeed  picks up a misspecification  in the
functional  form of per capita income  and therefore  abandoned  this approach.
IIEconomic analysis suggests that the effects of IPRs protection on bilateral trade flows are
theoretically ambiguous.  Because of the complex static and dynamic considerations rel'ated to a policy of
tighter protection, it is difficult to generate normative recommendations.  When estimating the effects of
IPRs protection in a gravity model of bilateral trade flows, our empirical results suggest that, on average,
higher levels of protection have significantly positive impact on non-fuel trade.  However, this result is
not confirmed when confining the estimation to high technology goods where we found IPRs to have no
statistically significant impact.
More empirical research is needed to gain more insight regarding the IPRs-trade link, especially at
industry and firm level.  The challenge of such research will be to find 'natural experiments' to overcome
the colineraty and endogeneity problems of the cross-country type of analyses like the present study.  One
alternative, for instance, would be to consider a country which at some point in the past significantly
changed its system of IPRs and to test for structural change.  A further important field of research  is to
examine the impact of tighter IPRs on FDI and their interplay with trade flows.
12Table 1: Definition  of the High Technology  Aggregate
SITC Codea  Description
513  Inorganic  Elements
514  Other Inorganic Chemicals
515  Radioactive Materials
533.1  Coloring Materials
541  Medicinal Products Excluding Pharmaceuticals
541.9  Pharmaceutical Goods
561.3  Potassic Fertilizers
571.2  Fuses and Detonators
571.4  Hunting and Sporting Ammunition
581.1  Plastics and Products of Condensation
581.2  Products of Polymerization
651.6  Synthetic Fibers
651.7  Yarn and Artificial Fibers
711.3  Steam Engines
711.4  Aircraft Engines
711.5  Internal Combustion Engines
711.6  Gas Turbines
711.8  Engines, nes
714  Office Machinery
724  Telecommunications Apparatus
729.3  Transistors, Photocell, etc.
729.7  Electron Accelerators
729.9  Electrical Machinery and Apparatus
734  Aircraft
861  Scientific Instruments
862  Photographic Supplies
891.1  Tape Recorders
891.2  Recorders of Sound
894.3  Nonmilitary Arms
899.6  Orthopedic Appliances
' Based on SITC  Revision I classification.
Source: Primo  Braga  and Yeats  (1992).
13Table 2:  Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Total Non-Fuel Importsa
Model  (I)  (II)
Equation  Probit  Gravity  Probit  Gravity
Intercept  -7.000  -10.228  -6.960  -10.9:56
(-27.40)  (-29.02)  (26.28)  (-30.58)
GDPi  0.541  1.109  0.545  0.949
(31.47)  (51.73)  (29.90)  (34.98B)
GDPj  0.567  1.341  0.566  1.339
(32.36)  (61.89)  (32.33)  (62.12)
Populationi  -0.194  -0.233  -0.198  -0.08:2
(-9.80)  (-8.53)  (-9.17)  (-2.64)
Populationj  -0.058  -0.333  -0.058  -0.336
(-3.03)  (-12.76)  (-3.03)  (-12.97)
Distance  -0.435  -1.109  -0.437  -1.060
(-12.17)  (-23.87)  -12.15)  (-23.20)
Border  -0.376  0.179  -0.378  0.239
(-2.32)  (0.91)  (-2.33)  (1.27)
Language  0.592  0.861  0.591  0.867
(8.67)  (9.50)  (8.66)  (9.62)
EC  -0.264  -0.305
(-0.94)  (-1.08s)
EFTA  -0.393  -0.415
(-0.81)  (-0.86)
LAIA/LAFTA  0.713  0.951
(3.27)  (4.37)
ASEAN  2.269  2.476
(4.64)  (5.1  0)
CACM  2.133  2.414
(4.32)  (4.91)
IPRsb  -0.014  0.369
(-0.53)  (9.59)
2.100  2.08:3
obs.  7304  5492  7304  5492
-0.034  -0.043
-2 In  A  (p=  0)'  0.853  1.346
-2nX  ({,  A  I} = O)  8874.433  8965.677
a t-statistics in parentheses
b Park and Ginarte index of the destination country of the trade flow, that is countryj  in the case of exports and
country i in the case of imports.
c For a definition of the likelihood ratio test statistics, see Appendix A.
14Table 3:  Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Total Non-Fuel Exportsa
Model  (I)  (II)
Equation  Probit  Gravity  Probit  Gravity
Intercept  -6.631  -10.791  -6.766  -11.170
(-27.77)  (-29.31)  (-27.10)  (-29.55)
GDPi  0.556  1.374  0.556  1.374
(33.86)  (60.26)  (33.85)  (60.38)
GDPj  0.458  1.017  0.443  0.945
(29.84)  (46.85)  (25.93)  (35.11)
Populationi  -0.052  -0.320  -0.052  -0.320
(-2.84)  (-12.18)  (-2.83)  (-12.20)
Populationj  -0.153  -0.137  -0.137  -0.070
(-8.15)  (-4.90)  (-6.57)  (-2.17)
Distance  -0.473  -1.114  -0.467  -1.100
(-13.55)  (-23.69)  (-13.34)  (-23.41)
Border  -0.393  0.301  -0.381  0.328
(-2.54)  (1.52)  (-2.47)  (1.65)
Language  0.588  0.826  0.588  0.826
(8.96)  (8.95)  (8.97)  (8.98)
EC  -0.068  -0.096
(-0.24)  (-0.34)
EFTA  -0.137  -0.152
(-0.28)  (-0.31)
LAIA/LAFTA  0.822  0.944
(3.73)  (4.26)
ASEAN  2.352  2.442
(4.78)  (4.97)
CACM  2.127  2.267
(4.28)  (4.56)
IpRSb  0.047  0.176
(1.92)  (4.46)
2.113  2.109
obs.  7309  5294  7309  5294
0.005  0.002
-21nA(p=0)  0.016  0.003
-2 InA  ( {y,,/}  = 0)c  8520.968  8544.524
a t-statistics in parentheses
b Park and Ginarte index of the destination country of the trade flow, that is countryj  in the case of exports and
country i in the case of imports.
For a definition of the likelihood ratio test statistics, see Appendix A.
15Table 4:  Maximum Likelihood Estimates for High Technology Importsa
Model  (I)  (II)
Equation  Probit  Gravity  Probit  Gravity
Intercept  -5.494  -14.487  -4.794  -14.313
(-27.17)  (-26.21)  (-22.87)  (-26.95)
GDPi  0.568  0.911  0.717  0.960
(40.12)  (22.68)  (39.04)  (16.69)
GDPj  0.495  1.898  0.512  1.897
(36.36)  (52.12)  (36.45)  (52.38)
Populationi  -0.324  -0.086  -0.474  -0.132
(-18.71)  (-2.06)  (-22.59)  (-2.38)
Populationj  -0.170  -0.733  -0.175  -0.731
(-10.31)  (-20.70)  (-10.43)  (-20.70)
Distance  -0.421  -1.115  -0.466  -1.124
(-13.56)  (-19.1 1)  (-14.62)  (-19.00)
Border  0.011  0.157  -0.110  0.141
(0.08)  (0.64)  (-0.78)  (0.61)
Language  0.480  1.154  0.488  1.146
(8.54)  (9.53)  (8.43)  (9.49)
EC  0.224  0.227
(0.74)  (0.76)
EFTA  -0.053  -0.057
(-0.10)  (-O.  I 1)
LAIA/LAFTA  0.798  0.771
(3.24)  (3.08)
ASEAN  3.407  3.374
(6.53)  (6.46)
CACM  2.992  2.959
(5.63)  (5.55)
IpRsb  -0.340  -0.093
(-14.09)  (-1.50)
2.229  2.228
obs.  7304  3548  7304  3548
0.066  0.064
-21n2  (p=  0)C  1.354  1.309
-21n A ({y7,}  =0)C  7606.860  7812.274
a t-statistics in parentheses
b Park and Ginarte index of the destination country of the trade flow, that is countryj  in the case of exports and
country i in the case of imnports.
c For a definition of the likelihood ratio test statistics, see Appendix A.
16Table 5:  Maximum Likelihood Estimates for High Technology Exportsa
Model  (I)  (II)
Equation  Probit  Gravity  Probit  Gravity
Intercept  -8.300  -14.272  -8.334  -14.225
(-32.67)  (-28.75)  (-31.67)  (-28.02)
GDPi  0.987  1.804  0.987  1.803
(47.17)  (44.86)  (47.15)  (44.85)
GDPj  0.270  0.927  0.265  0.936
(18.71)  (36.09)  (15.10)  (29.05)
Populationi  -0.305  -0.658  -0.305  -0.658
(-17.00)  (-18.43)  (-17.01)  (-18.41)
Populationj  -0.086  -0.097  -0.081  -0.105
(-4.28)  (-2.67)  (-3.60)  (-2.59)
Distance  -0.596  -1.062  -0.595  -1.064
(-17.27)  (-18.78)  (17.21)  (-18.76)
Border  -0.121  0.129  -0.116  0.124
(-0.84)  (0.58)  (-0.810)  (0.565)
Language  0.706  1.225  0.707  1.226
(11.01)  (10.66)  (11.03)  (10.67)
EC  0.326  0.332
(1.14)  (1.15)
EFTA  0.086  0.089
(0.17)  (0.18)
LAIA/LAFTA  0.720  0.702
(2.96)  (2.86)
ASEAN  3.467  3.455
(6.97)  (6.93)
CACM  2.661  2.640
(5.20)  (5.15)
,pRSb  0.0132  -0.022
(0.50)  (-0.45)
2.121  2.121
obs.  7309  3342  7309  3342
-0.027  -0.027
-2 In A (p=  O)c  0.451  0.442
-2 InA ({r,,f}  = Q)O  8725.684  8726.127
a t-statistics  in parentheses
b Park and Ginarte  index  of the destination  country  of the trade flow,  that is countryj in the case of exports  and
country  i in the case of imnports.
c For a definition  of the likelihood  ratio test statistics,  see Appendix  A.
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20Appendix  A: Description  of Likelihood  Function  and Likelihood  Ratio  Tests
Following Bikker and de Vos (1992), the likelihood function can be derived as follows.  From (1), the
likelihood of zero observations can be written as:
(A.  1)  P(Iy =0) = D(-z,,Y)  ,
where  cD  denotes the standard normal distribution function.  Recalling that the conditional density ofv,
given u,  is given by  u,,p / a + £j,  where  &,  is (univariate) normally distributed with mean zero and
variance I _  p
2 , the likelihood of non-zero observations is:
P(Iij  = YU;) = P(ZUy  + Vvy  > °|  uij )  4 (Yu  - XUy8fi  oI  C
(A.2)  = (D[(z,,r  +  P(yU - Xfij/) I O-)  / (  _  p2 )112]4(Yj  _  XUjj« /1  ]
where  0  denotes the standard normal distribution function.  From (A. 1) and (A.2) the logarithm of the
complete likelihood function is:
In L(y,,6,  a,p) = E In (D-z,,v)
(A.3)  i0
+  E  {In  [(Z,y + P(YU  - x,f)  I  a)  / (I - p 2 )12]  inoa+ In  4(y.  - x,j)  / va]}
14  =yy
The log-likelihood function can be maximized by iterative procedures.  To test whether the correlation
coefficient  p  is statistically different from zero, we apply a likelihood ratio test.  This can be done by
maximizing the likelihood function in (A.3) under the restriction p-  0 and computing the liklihood ratio
(A.2)  A = Lm;  ,: I L*,
where  L*  denotes the maximum of the likelihood function in the restricted model and Lm,  the
maximum of the likelihood function in the unrestricted model.  The test statistic - 2 In 2  (as reported in
Table 1) is asymptotically chi-square distributed.
Similarly, the joint statistical significance of all explanatory variables can be tested by restricting all
coefficients (except the coefficients on the intercepts) to zero and computing the corresponding likelihood
ratio.
21Data Appendix
Data on bilateral trade flows were extracteed  from the United Nations Comtrade database.  We collected
data for the following 89 countries:
Algeria  Haiti  Papua New Guinea
Argentinac  Hondurase  Paraguayc
Australia  Hong Kong  Peru 0
Austriab  India  Philippinesd
Bangladesh  Indonesia0 Portugal
Belgium-Luxembourga  Irar  Saudi Arabia
Benin  irelanda  Senegal
Bolivia0 TIsrael  Singapored
Brazilc  Ita!ya  Somalia
Burma  Jamaica  Spain
Cameroon  Japan  Sri Lanka
Canada  Jorda:n  Swedenb
Chilec  Kenya  Switzerlandb
Colombiac  Korea  Syria
Congo  Kuw,ai  Tanzania
Costa Ricae  Madagascar  Thailandd
Cote D'Ivoire  'a1  ay siad  Togo
Denmarka  MViauritania  Trinidad and Tobago
Dominican Republic  Mauritius  Tunisia
Ecuadorc  Mexicoc  Turkey
Egypt  Morocco  United Arab Emirates
El Salvador0  Netlerlandsa  United Kingdoma
Ethiopia  New Zealand  United States
Finlandb  Nicaragua0 UruguayC
Francea  Niger  Venezuelac
Gabon  Nigeria  Yemen
Germanya  Norwayb  Zaire
Ghana  Oman  Zambia
Greecea  Pakistan  Zimbabwe
Guatemalae  Paarna
a European Community (BC)
b European Free Trade Association (BEFTA)
0 Latin American Integration Assoc.atio  Latin American Free Trade Association (LAIA/LAF17A)
d Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
e Central American Common MarkeL  (CACM)
All countries except Zam;bia  served as reporter and partner countries of bilateral trade flows.  Zambia was
not listed as a reporter in the database.  This sums to a maxim  um of [(89 x 88) - 88] = 7744 observations.
In the estimation, the dataset had to be further reduced. because the Park and Ginarte index did not
include rankings for Kuwait, Oman, Unrited  Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Belgium-Luxembourg also had
to be excluded, because the two countries have different lERs regimes.  However, these countries could
still serve as source countries of trade flo-. s.  Ts  explains the total of 7309 observation for exports and
227304 observations  for imports. Trade data refer to 1989  US$ value of total non-fuel  trade (SITC 0
through 9-3) and high technology  trade (see Table 1).
1989  US$ GDP (Atlas method)  and population  were taken from the World  Bank. Geographical  distance
is the straight-line  distance between  the economic  centers  of the respective  countries  and was taken from
Erzan,  Holmes,  and Safadi  (1992). The languages  included  in the corresponding  dummy  variable  are
Arabic,  English,  Portuguese,  and Spanish. We are most grateful  to Raed Safadi  in providing  the data for
the gravity variables.
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